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Abstract
Policy makers sometimes intervene in patent licensing negotiations to guide licensing
fees, but the impacts of such interventions on economic growth and welfare are relatively
unknown. This paper develops a novel Schumpeterian growth model featuring a cooper-
ative game-theoretic framework that describes negotiations about licensing fees. We find
that the growth effect of intervention is negative if firms can raise unlimited external funds
for their R&D investment. However, when the amount of external funds available is limited,
both the growth and the welfare effects of intervention can be positive. This result means
that interventions are desirable when the internal funds of firms are the main source of their
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Patent licensing fees are often determined through private negotiations between the relevant
firms, but policy makers and some organizations can indirectly influence such fees through
interventions. For example, competition authorities sometimes sue firms that charge unfair
and anti-competitive licensing fees.1 Similarly, standard-setting organizations request that
firms that hold standard-essential patents in an industry license them under fair, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) conditions. We examine the impacts of such an (indirect)
intervention on economic growth and welfare.
Patent licensing is an important way for patent holders to benefit from their inventions; in
other words, licensing provides an incentive for potential innovators to innovate further. From
this perspective, the literature on Schumpeterian growth theory has recently emphasized the
role of patent licensing in economic growth (e.g., O’donoghue and Zweimüller, 2004; Chu,
2009; Chu et al., 2012; Chu and Pan, 2013; Niwa, 2016; Niwa, 2018; Yang, 2018; Suzuki, 2020).
However, most of these previous studies give little attention to the process by which the licensing
fee is determined.2 They simply assume that the licensing fee is an exogenous fraction of the
licensee’s profit. Thus, in the above literature, licensing fees are often regarded as a policy
variable with the assumption that policy makers can directly control licensing fees.
We develop a novel Schumpeterian growth model in which licensing fees are endogenously
determined as a result of a cooperative game representing the licensing negotiation. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to consider a synthesis of cooperative game theory and
Schumpeterian growth theory. There are two advantages to formulating the patent licensing
negotiation as a cooperative game. First, we can describe a situation in which the relative
bargaining power between firms is determined by the market structure and affects the licensing
fee, as shown in some empirical studies (e.g., Sakakibara, 2010). As mentioned above, most of
the literature on endogenous growth theory has not considered the interactions between the
relevant firms in the negotiations on the licensing fee. In this sense, our framework provides
a microfoundation for licensing fees. Second, we can investigate licensing fees determined
through patent licensing negotiations in which policy makers moderately intervene. Most of
the literature analyzes the direct control of the licensing fee (i.e., compulsory interventions),
but we consider a milder intervention often implemented in reality. Therefore, our framework
complements the existing studies.
This paper compares two solution concepts from cooperative game theory to investigate
the effects of interventions in patent licensing negotiations on economic growth and welfare.
1As a recent example, the Federal Trade Commission in the United States has insisted that Qualcomm has illegally
charged an excessive licensing fee in the market for smartphone chips.
2An exception is Suzuki (2020), which incorporates an innovator’s voluntary patent licensing into a Schumpeterian
growth model. In this model, unlike in previous studies, the licensing fee is endogenously determined by the
innovator’s maximization problem. He assumes a take-it-or-leave-it licensing offer; i.e., the patent holder first
announces a licensing fee, and then other firms decide whether to become licensees. However, in actual patent
licensing contracts, the innovator would not be able to unilaterally set the licensing fee because firms often negotiate
to license the patent. Our paper complements this study by describing such a negotiation process.
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The first solution is the bargaining set. This solution is defined based on the incentives for
negotiating firms to gain more profits. Thus, the bargaining set provides a licensing fee that
is determined through negotiation in the case of no intervention. The second is the Aumann-
Drèze value, which provides the licensing fee in the case of intervention. The Aumann-Drèze
value is an extension of the Shapley value and generates a fair profit division based on the
contribution of the negotiating firms to their total profit. As noted above, policy makers are
concerned about whether licensing fees are fair. Therefore, we analyze a licensing fee in the case
of intervention by adopting the Aumann-Drèze value, which embeds a concept of fairness.3
Our main findings are summarized as follows. The negotiation without intervention yields
an exploitative licensing fee, but the intervention decreases the licensing fee. The growth effect
of the intervention is negative when firms can raise unlimited external funds for their R&D
investment. However, the growth effect becomes positive when the amount of external funds
available is limited. Furthermore, our quantitative analysis shows that the intervention can
increase welfare when external funds are less available and patent protection is sufficiently
strong. These results mean that the intervention can increase both growth and welfare when
the internal funds of firms are the primary source of their R&D investment in an economy with
strong patent protection.
Related literature
There are three strands in the theoretical literature on patent licensing: (i) endogenous growth
theory, (ii) North-South growth theory, and (iii) game theory.
First, in endogenous growth theory, most of the literature considers a situation in which
the new innovator becomes a licensee of past innovators to avoid infringement on their patents
and is the exclusive user of the new patented technology (e.g., O’donoghue and Zweimüller,
2004; Chu, 2009; Chu et al., 2012; Chu and Pan, 2013; Niwa, 2016; Niwa, 2018; Yang, 2018). In
contrast, our model considers a different situation in which not only the new innovator but also
other firms utilize the new technology through patent licensing. Therefore, we complement the
above literature.
Second, some studies in North-South growth theory models international patent licensing
as a random process (e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.7); Yang and Maskus (2001, 2009);
Tanaka et al. (2007)). For example, in Yang and Maskus (2001), a Northern innovator decides
how much effort to devote to licensing his/her patent to Southern firms. The probability of
successful licensing is endogenously determined in the steady-state equilibrium. Similar to the
literature on endogenous growth theory, these studies assume the exogenous profit division
rule between the Northern innovator and the Southern licensee. As an exception, Yang and
Maskus (2009) consider Nash bargaining, which determines the shares of joint surplus from
sales under licensing. However, in their study, because exogenous bargaining power directly
determines the shares in Nash bargaining, in practice they also consider the profit division to




Third, as an application of game theory, patent licensing has been extensively studied since
the seminal paper of Kamien and Tauman (1986). To investigate the innovator’s optimal li-
censing contracts, which are endogenously determined, subsequent studies often formulate
take-it-or-leave-it offers for licensing contracts as noncooperative games (e.g., Muto, 1993; Sen
and Tauman, 2007; Chen, 2017). As noted above, on the other hand, licensing contracts can be
determined through negotiations. From this practical viewpoint, several studies have formu-
lated negotiations about licensing fees as cooperative games (e.g., Tauman and Watanabe, 2007;
Watanabe and Muto, 2008). In particular, Kishimoto et al. (2011) apply the model of Watanabe
and Muto (2008) to licensing a cost-reducing innovation in a large Cournot market and show
that the fair profit division represented by the Aumann-Drèze value is not necessarily one of the
bargaining outcomes realized in the bargaining set. In this paper, by regarding the Aumann-
Drèze value as a policy maker’s intervention, we shed light on the relationship between the two
solution concepts from a macroeconomic viewpoint.
Roadmap
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 considers a
licensing negotiation without intervention, derives the licensing fee in the bargaining set, and
solves for the steady state. Section 4 derives a fair licensing fee by applying the Aumann-Drèze
value and solves for the steady state. Section 5 investigates the growth and welfare effects of
the intervention in the licensing negotiation. Sections 3 to 5 assume that the R&D investment is
not financially constrained. Section 6 introduces some financial constraints and reinvestigates
the growth and welfare effects of the intervention. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 A model with licensing negotiation
In this section, we build a baseline model that considers patent licensing through negotiations.
Our model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4). We extend their model by (a) intro-
ducing negotiations on licensing fees, (b) considering the R&D activities of the licensees instead
of potential firms, and (c) assuming Cournot competition instead of Bertrand competition.4
2.1 Households
The household setup is the same as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4). We consider an
economy consisting of L identical and infinitely lived households. Time is continuous. There
is no population growth. Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor and earns
a wage in every period. The representative household has the following intertemporal utility
4Under Bertrand competition, the profit of the licensees becomes zero because their goods are perfect substitutes,
so they cannot pay the licensing fee to the innovator. Therefore, we consider Cournot competition so that the






exp(−ρt) ln ctdt, (1)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate and ct is an index for consumption at time t. The economy
has a continuum of industries indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and households consume final goods from













where xkt(i) is the consumption of a good, the quality of which is λ
k in industry i at time t,
and k̃(i) means that there are k̃(i) + 1 generations of the good in industry i. According to the
additive specification in the abovementioned period utility function, k̃(i) + 1 generations of the
good are perfect substitutes for households. The quality of each good is represented by the
k-th power of λ > 1 (k = 0, 1, ..., k̃(i)), which means that the quality of the new good is λ times
higher than that of the previous good.
The budget constraint for each household is
ȧt = rtat + wt − et.
at is the real value of assets (equities), and rt is the real interest rate. wt is the wage rate. et is












where pkt(i) is the price of the good with quality λ
k.
We solve the utility maximization problem in two parts: the static problem and the dynamic
problem. First, given instantaneous expenditure level et, we maximize the period utility function
ln ct. Given the logarithmic utility function, households spend their budget equally across
product lines i ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for each product line, they choose the latest good that has
the lowest quality-adjusted price. Therefore, individual demand in industry i is xk̃(i)t(i) =
et/pk̃(i)t(i) and xkt(i) = 0 for k = 0, 1, ..., k̃(i)− 1.
Second, we solve the dynamic maximization problem. Each household decides its ex-
penditure Et in each period to maximize its intertemporal utility function, Ut, subject to the
intertemporal budget constraint. The household’s indirect period utility function is given by
ln ct = ln et − ln Pt, where Pt is the ideal price index associated with the consumption index ct,










Given the aggregate price index, households spend to maximize their intertemporal utility.
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From the maximization result, the household’s optimal time path for spending is represented
by ėt/et = rt − ρ. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4) and many subsequent studies,
we treat aggregate expenditure Et ≡ etL as the numéraire by normalizing the price index in each
period so that Et = Pt · ctL = 1. This means that the price index falls over time at a rate equal to
the growth rate of the consumption index. From this, we obtain et = 1/L and rt = ρ. Hereafter,
the notation omits t and i in cases in which there is no risk of misunderstanding.
2.2 Industries
Consider an industry in which there is an innovator who holds a patent for a state-of-the-art
good and potential imitators who can copy the innovator’s good. Following Goh and Olivier
(2002), we assume that the unit cost of producing an imitative good is increasing in patent
breadth. Specifically, while the innovator can produce one state-of-the-art good by devoting
one unit of labor to its production, the potential imitators must employ χ > 1 units of labor to
produce one unit of the same quality good. The cost disadvantage χ ∈ (1, λ) can be interpreted
as the degree of patent breadth, which is the extent to which patent holders can legally prevent
imitators from copying their patented technologies. For example, if the patent breadth is as
narrow as possible (χ = 1), potential imitators can perfectly imitate the production technology
of the innovator.
Patent licensing through bargaining
The innovator can license his/her own patent to potential imitators. Firms that are licensed
the innovator’s patent (licensees) can use the innovator’s production technology. Hereafter, the
innovator and licensees are often referred to as technology holders.
Let the innovator be denoted by I, and let S be the set of ℓ licensees (i.e., |S| = ℓ).5 The
innovator and all firms in S negotiate how much the licensees will pay to the innovator as
licensing fees. In the industry, infinite potential imitators exist during licensing negotiations. We
formulate the negotiation on the assumption that m potential imitators exist, where 0 < m < ∞,
and by taking the limit m → ∞, we specify the negotiation outcomes for the case in which
infinite imitators exist.
Let F ≥ 0 be the licensing fee paid by each licensee to the innovator in each period. Let π̄Th
be the gross profit that a technology holder gains from production. Then, the net profit of the
innovator is πI ≡ π̄Th + ℓF, while the net profit of each licensee is πℓ ≡ π̄Th − F. We also use
the ratio of the licensing fee to the licensee’s (gross) profit, which is defined as f ≡ F/π̄Th.
After the licensing negotiation, the innovator, ℓ licensees, and infinite imitators engage
in Cournot competition, with each knowing which firms are licensed or not. Following the
literature on patent licensing through bargaining, we assume that cartels are not allowed by the
competition authority in the product market.
5For any finite set N, |N| means the cardinality of N.
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R&D
The licensees can perform R&D to create a good with quality λ times higher than that of the
previous good. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4), we assume that the success
of the R&D investment follows a Poisson process and that its technology is linear. Specifically,
if a licensee hires z researchers, he/she performs successful R&D with a small probability θz,
where θ > 0 is the parameter of R&D efficiency.
Note that the innovator does not perform R&D because of the Arrow replacement effect, as
in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4) and subsequent studies. Even if the current innovator
succeeds in performing R&D, his/her firm’s value does not increase because the latest good
is instantaneously imitated by the other firms. Empirically, the incentive to innovate tends
to be weak for the innovator, even though he/she has the ability to innovate. For example,
Igami (2017) shows that successful incumbents in the hard disk drive industry are reluctant to
innovate even though they have a substantial cost advantage.
Furthermore, we assume that nonlicensees do not perform R&D activities. This assumption
can be justified by assuming that the research productivity of licensees is sufficiently higher
than that of nonlicensees. Empirically, Wang et al. (2013) find a “learning-by-licensing” pro-
cess among licensees by showing that licensees perform better in subsequent innovation than
nonlicensees do.
The schedule
Suppose that one of the licensees in an industry conducts successful R&D and becomes a new
innovator. After the new innovator obtains a patent on the latest good, each firm in the industry
behaves in accordance with the following procedure.
1. The innovator chooses the number of firms that join the licensing negotiation.6
2. The licensing fee F is endogenously determined through the negotiation.
3. The innovator, licensees, and imitators engage in Cournot competition.
4. Each licensee pays the licensing fee F to the innovator.
5. The licensees conduct their own R&D.
6. If a licensee conducts successful R&D, he/she becomes the new innovator (and the process
begins again with step 1). Otherwise, replacement does not occur in this period (and the
process begins again with step 3).
We assume that the number of licensees chosen by the new innovator is the same as that
chosen by the previous innovator. Further, to avoid complexity, we assume that the new
6The patent holders have the statutory right to exclude others from making or selling their invention. Therefore,







Quality in a product line
Licensing
Figure 1: The model structure. The quality ladder on the left-hand side illustrates a situation in which
the old technology holders are licensed through negotiation. As illustrated on the right-hand side, after
one of the licensees conducts successful R&D, that licensee becomes the new innovator, who has the
patent for the latest good, the quality of which is higher than that of the previous good. Then, through
a new negotiation, the old innovator and old licensees are licensed. Note that this figure does not mean
that the model has two different states because negotiation starts and ends instantaneously. In this
model, there is no operating imitator in equilibrium, as we will see later.
innovator licenses his/her patent to the other old technology holders. In other words, we
consider a stationary situation in which the group of firms holding the latest technology is the
same over time.7 Figure 1 briefly illustrates this industrial structure.
3 The outcomes under no intervention in the licensing negotiation
This section considers a licensing negotiation in which policy makers do not intervene and
in which R&D investment is assumed to not be financially constrained. The model with this
assumption is referred to as the unconstrained economy.
3.1 Static outcomes in an industry
3.1.1 Cournot competition
Consider an industry in which an innovator, ℓ licensees, and m imitators produce the same good
and engage in Cournot competition. Let M be a set of m imitators. (Note that the set of all firms
in this industry is {I} ∪ S ∪ M.) Let yj be firm j’s production level, and let y ≡ (yj)j∈{I}∪S∪M be
the production vector. As derived in Subsection 2.1, the inverse demand function for the latest
7This assumption seems to be realistic when the innovation is not very drastic. If the innovation is very drastic
(e.g., the birth of general purpose technologies), the old technologies are rapidly made obsolete, and the old
technologies holders are quickly excluded from the market. However, if innovation is incremental, firm exit and
entry are relatively mild. Thus, our quality-ladder setup models the latter case.
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good in an industry is p(X) = 1/X, where X ≡ xL is the aggregate demand in the industry.
Given the inverse demand function and the wage rate w of one unit of labor, firm j maximizes





where γj is the unit cost of firm production. Note that γj = 1 when firm j is a technology





where Y is the aggregate output of the industry. By the first-order condition for firm j’s profit
maximization, we obtain the output of firm j as follows:
∂π̄j
∂yj






yj − γjw = 0
⇔ yj = X − X
2γjw. (3)
By this equation and the market clearing condition, we can derive the industry’s aggregate
output in Cournot equilibrium as follows:
Y(ℓ, m) =
ℓ+ m




Then, by p = 1/Y, the Cournot equilibrium price p(ℓ, m) is
p(ℓ, m) =
1 + ℓ+ mχ
ℓ+ m
w.
Let ℓ∗ ≡ 1/(χ − 1). If ℓ > ℓ∗, then p(ℓ, m) < χw; that is, the Cournot equilibrium price is less
than the unit cost of the imitators. Thus, all imitators are excluded from production (i.e., the
Cournot equilibrium output of each imitator is zero).
Let yTh(ℓ, m) and yIm(ℓ, m) denote the Cournot equilibrium outputs of a technology holder
(the innovator or a licensee) and an imitator, respectively. Recall that γj = 1 if firm j is a


























if ℓ < ℓ∗
0 if ℓ ≥ ℓ∗.
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if ℓ < ℓ∗
0 if ℓ ≥ ℓ∗,
(6)
respectively.
3.1.2 Bargaining outcomes for patent licensing under the bargaining set
We analyze the patent licensing negotiation by the following procedure. First, according to
Watanabe and Muto (2008), on the assumption that the number of potential imitators m is
finite, we formulate the negotiation as a cooperative game with a coalition structure. Second,
we introduce the bargaining set for a coalition structure, which represents the bargaining
outcomes under no intervention. Finally, we derive the bargaining outcomes in patent licensing
for the case in which the number of potential imitators increases to infinity (m → ∞) because
infinitely many imitators exist within the industry.
Formulation as a cooperative game
We formalize patent licensing through bargaining as a cooperative game with a coalition struc-
ture. Recall that the innovator is denoted by I, and let S and M be the sets of ℓ licensees and
m potential imitators, respectively (i.e., |S| = ℓ and |M| = m). The set of all players in this
cooperative game is {I} ∪ S ∪ M. In the following argument, let n ≡ ℓ+ m for notational ease.
A nonempty subset of {I} ∪ S ∪ M is called a coalition. The imitators, who do not belong to
{I}∪ S, cannot participate in the licensing negotiation but play a relevant role in determining the
outside options of the firms in {I} ∪ S. Furthermore, each firm in {I} ∪ S should claim credible
outside options in the negotiation process. Therefore, for each coalition, we need to provide
the worth of the coalition, which is the total profit that the firms belonging to the coalition
can guarantee for themselves in the worst case.8 We define the worth of each coalition, which
is generally called the characteristic function, as the sum of the (gross) Cournot equilibrium
profits of the firms in the coalition. Then, the characteristic function v : 2{I}∪S∪M → R is given
by
v(∅) = 0,
v({I} ∪ T) = (1 + t)π̄Th(t, n − t),
v(T) = tπ̄Im(n − t, t)
8According to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the worth of each coalition is defined from a pessimistic
viewpoint. This definition does not play an important role in deriving our propositions.
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for each T ⊆ S ∪ M with t = |T| (t = 0 if T = ∅). When the innovator stops licensing to the
firms in S and the patented technology is transferred to the firms in T (⊆ S ∪ M), the other
n − t firms are not licensed, and the total (gross) Cournot equilibrium profit of the innovator
and the new licensees in T is (1 + t)π̄Th(t, n − t); thus, v({I} ∪ T) = (1 + t)π̄Th(t, n − t). v(T)
is the total (gross) Cournot equilibrium profit that the firms in T can guarantee for themselves
in the worst case. When some (or all) firms in S jointly break off the negotiation and form a
coalition T that does not include the innovator, the worst case in our model is that the firms in
T become imitators and all the other n − t firms are licensed. Thus, v(T) = tπ̄Im(n − t, t).9
For a set of licensees S, the permissible coalition structure is denoted by P(S) ≡ {{I} ∪ S} ∪
{{j}|j ∈ M}. The coalition structure P(S) means that firms in {I} ∪ S can communicate with
one another, but imitators in M are not allowed to communicate with any firms. ({I} ∪ S ∪
M, v, P(S)) denotes a cooperative game with coalition structure P(S), which we sometimes call
a cooperative game if no confusion could arise.
Bargaining outcomes for patent licensing under the bargaining set
We consider the bargaining set of the cooperative game ({I}∪ S∪ M, v, P(S)).10 In what follows,
we consider only a nonempty set of licensees S (i.e., S ̸= ∅) and fix it because the outcome is
uniquely determined if S = ∅ (i.e., no licensing occurs).
Let π ≡ (πI , (πi)i∈S, (πj)j∈M), which means a (net) profit vector. Then, the set of imputations









πI + ∑i∈S πi = (1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ, m), πI ≥ π̄Th(0, n),
πi ≥ π̄Im(n − 1, 1) ∀i ∈ S, and πj = π̄Im(ℓ, m) ∀j ∈ M
}
Π(S) implies the set of outcomes for patent licensing through negotiation among the innovator
and ℓ licensees. Firms in {I} ∪ S divide the total (gross) Cournot equilibrium profit of the
innovator and ℓ licensees with each i ∈ {I} ∪ S being guaranteed the worst payoff v({i}). Each
imitator in M obtains the (gross) equilibrium profit π̄Im(ℓ, m) because ℓ firms are licensed.
Let i, j ∈ {I} ∪ S and π ∈ Π(S). We say that i has an objection (π′, T) against j at π if
i ∈ T, j /∈ T, T ⊆ {I} ∪ S ∪ M, π′k > πk for any k ∈ T and ∑k∈T π
′
k ≤ v(T) and that j has a
counter-objection (π′′, R) to i’s objection (π′, T) if j ∈ R, i /∈ R, R ⊆ {I} ∪ S ∪ M, π′′k ≥ πk for
any k ∈ R, π′′k ≥ π
′
k for any k ∈ R ∩ T and ∑k∈R π
′′
k ≤ v(R). Furthermore, we say that i has a
justified objection (π′, T) at π if there exists no counter-objection to i’s objection (π′, T). Then,
the bargaining set for the coalition structure P(S) is defined as
BS ≡ {π ∈ Π(S) | no firm in {I} ∪ S has a justified objection at π}.
9Actually, v(T) is redundant for each T ⊆ M because no firm in such a coalition participates in the negotiation.
By convention, however, we define the worth of all coalitions.
10In cooperative game theory, one of the standard solution concepts is the core. In our model, however, the core
for the coalition structure P(S) is empty if m ≥ 1. Watanabe and Muto (2008) also show the emptiness of the core in
their model, similar to ours. In general, for each coalition structure, the core is included in the bargaining set; thus,
we use the bargaining set.
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The imputations that belong to BS are regarded as stable bargaining outcomes because there
exists no firm in {I}∪ S that has a justified objection to them.11 Note that the coalitions proposed
in objections (or counter-objections) do not actually form because coalition {I} ∪ S eventually
forms; that is, in the negotiation, each firm in {I} ∪ S makes objections (or counter-objections)
against another firm via a coalition T (or R) that is feasible but does not actually form.
We analyze the bargaining set for the coalition structure P(S) under the condition that the
number of potential imitators is infinitely large (m → ∞). For notational ease, let π̄Th(ℓ) denote
the gross Cournot equilibrium profit of each technology holder for the case in which ℓ firms
are licensed and infinitely many potential imitators exist; that is, π̄Th(ℓ) ≡ limm→∞ π̄Th(ℓ, m).
Then, the next proposition holds.
Proposition 1. Consider the case in which an infinite number of potential imitators exist, and let FB(ℓ)
be the licensing fee that corresponds to the imputations in the bargaining set for coalition structure P(S),
where |S| = ℓ. Then, for each number of licensees ℓ, FB(ℓ) = π̄Th(ℓ), and the optimal number of
licensees for the innovator is ℓ∗; that is, the innovator licenses to ℓ∗ firms, and each licensee pays its entire
profit as the fee.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the patent licensing negotiation based on the bargaining set, the ratio of the licensing fee
to (gross) profit is f B ≡ FB(ℓ)/π̄Th(ℓ) = 1 for each number of licensees ℓ. This means that the
innovator can extract the entire profit of all licensees in the bargaining outcomes. Intuitively,
when the number of imitators becomes infinitely large, it is harder for each licensee in S to
make objections and counter-objections against the innovator because the nonlicensees’ (gross)
profits tend to be zero. In other words, the bargaining power of each licensee in S decreases
as the number of potential imitators increases. As a result, the net profits of the innovator and
each licensee are πBI (ℓ) = (1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ) and π
B
ℓ
(ℓ) = 0, respectively, and the innovator’s net
profit is maximized when ℓ = ℓ∗.
3.2 Dynamic outcomes in an industry and general equilibrium
Bellman equations
Let VI and Vℓ be the innovator’s firm value and the licensee’s firm value, respectively. We
assume that there is a perfectly risk-free asset market and that the interest rate on the safe asset
at period t is rt. For notational convenience, we define the aggregate R&D intensity as Z ≡ ℓz.
First, we consider a licensee’s maximization problem for z. As a result of the licensing
negotiation, a licensee’s net profit is zero (πB
ℓ
(ℓ) = 0). However, the licensee can raise its firm
value to VI from Vℓ with a probability of θz by paying zw as its R&D cost. Then, standard
11The bargaining set for a coalition structure is always nonempty, which is shown by Davis and Maschler (1967)
and Peleg (1967). Furthermore, for each coalition structure, the bargaining set includes the kernel and the nucleolus,
which are regarded as normative solutions based on the complaints of the coalitions about each imputation.
12
arguments imply that the licensee’s firm value satisfies the following Bellman equation:12
rVℓ − V̇ℓ = max
z
{θz(VI − Vℓ)− zw}. (7)
In the R&D investment decision, the licensee chooses z to maximize the right-hand side (RHS)
of (7), taking VI and w as given.
Second, we consider the innovator’s maximization problem in terms of ℓ. The innovator
earns a net profit πBI (ℓ) = (1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ) in every period. However, the innovator’s stock
partially loses its value due to creative destruction (happening at the rate of θZ). The innovator’s
Bellman equation is
rVI − V̇I = max
ℓ
{
(1 − 1/χ)2 if ℓ = 0
(1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ)− θZ(VI − Vℓ) if ℓ > 0
}
. (8)
The innovator maximizes the RHS of (8) for ℓ. In the maximization, the innovator takes Z as
given when ℓ > 0.13 However, we assume that the innovator knows that Z = 0 holds when
the innovator chooses ℓ = 0. We show a parameter condition that implies that the innovator
chooses ℓ = ℓ∗ > 0 later. Hereafter, we solve for the equilibrium by using this result in advance.
Labor market equilibrium
Labor is devoted to production and R&D. In the labor market equilibrium, aggregate labor
demand must be equal to labor supply L. Let y∗Th denote the Cournot equilibrium quantity of
each technology holder for the case in which ℓ∗ firms are licensed. When ℓ∗ firms are licensed,
the infinite imitators are driven out of the market. Then, (1 + ℓ∗)y∗Th = 1/(χw) holds. Hence,
the condition for labor market equilibrium is
1
χw
+ Z = L. (9)
Steady state
In the economy, all variables are constant over time in the steady state. Using V̇I = V̇ℓ = 0, the
optimization conditions, and the equilibrium conditions, we solve for the steady state value of
aggregate R&D intensity in the economy.
With V̇I = 0, r = ρ, and ℓ = ℓ
∗, we obtain






∗) = (1 + ℓ∗)π̄Th(ℓ
∗).
12Recall that a licensee can be licensed again after another licensee succeeds in R&D. Therefore, the licensee’s
stock does not lose its value even if another licensee succeeds in the R&D.
13Since the R&D technology is linear, z is indeterminate in the model and is determined in the steady state.
Therefore, Z = ℓz is uncontrollable for the innovator.
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Next, we consider the steady state value of Vℓ. Let z
∗ be the optimal value in (7). If
θ(VI − Vℓ) > w, then z
∗ goes to infinity. However, in the steady state, because VI converges
to Vℓ when z
∗ → ∞ by (10), the case of θ(VI − Vℓ) > w never happens as long as the wage is
strictly positive; thus, θ(VI − Vℓ) ≤ w holds. If θ(VI − Vℓ) < w, then z
∗ = 0, which is trivial, so
we focus on the case of
θ(VI − Vℓ) = w. (11)
Then, by πB
ℓ
(ℓ∗) = 0, (7), and (11), we obtain
V̇ℓ = 0 ⇔ Vℓ = 0. (12)
The steady state is unique, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4). Since there are only
jumpable variables in the dynamics, there are no transitional dynamics in the model. Hence,
we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that policy makers do not intervene in licensing negotiations. Then, the economy
immediately jumps to the unique steady state at t = 0 and remains there forever.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us solve for aggregate R&D intensity in the steady state. Substituting (5), (12), and










By (13) and (14), we obtain aggregate R&D intensity under the bargaining set in the uncon-
strained economy as follows:
Z∗ =
(χ − 1)L − ρ/θ
χ
≡ ZBU . (15)
Optimal number of licensees
We consider the optimal number of licensees from the dynamic viewpoint of the innovator. In
Proposition 1, we already showed that ℓ∗ is statically optimal. However, in the long run, an
innovator faces a trade-off between licensing revenue and the risk of replacement caused by a
licensee’s further innovation. Therefore, dynamically, the innovator may have an incentive to
choose a smaller ℓ. We show a parameter condition that ensures that ℓ∗ is also dynamically









is a sufficient condition for ℓ∗ ≡ 1/(χ − 1) to be dynamically optimal for the innovator.
Proof. See Appendix.
Parameter condition (16) is likely to be satisfied when the risk of further innovation is small
(small θ) or the innovator is sufficiently myopic (large ρ).
4 The outcomes under intervention in the licensing negotiation
In the previous section, we considered the bargaining set as the solution concept in the patent
licensing negotiation. The bargaining set can be interpreted as representing the negotiation
outcomes based on the firms’ own incentives without any intervention from the outside. As
discussed in Section 3, such laissez-faire negotiation yields an extremely unfair licensing fee
( f B = 1) because the innovator’s bargaining power is strong. In reality, as stated in Section 1,
policy makers may intervene in patent licensing negotiations to correct unfair licensing fees.
Therefore, this section considers a situation in which policy makers intervene in the patent
licensing negotiations between the innovator and ℓ∗ licensees.
In this section, we consider profit division according to the Aumann-Drèze value, which
is an extension of the Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures. Aumann
and Drèze (1974) provide a set of axioms that characterizes the value, and the Aumann-Drèze
value is regarded as a “fair” profit division among the firms in the patent licensing negotiation.
After we obtain the Aumann-Drèze value as the static outcome in an industry, we solve for the
steady state in the unconstrained economy. Then, in the next section, we compare the results
from adopting the Aumann-Drèze value with those from adopting the bargaining set from the
perspectives of the growth rate and of welfare.
4.1 Static outcomes in an industry
Note that the Cournot equilibrium outcomes and the formulation of the cooperative game are
exactly the same as in the previous section.
Bargaining outcomes for patent licensing under the Aumann-Drèze value
Let ϕS(∈ Rn+1) denote the Aumann-Drèze value of our cooperative game with coalition struc-
ture P(S). Recall that ℓ = |S|, and for each i ∈ {I}∪ S, let t′ = |T′| for T′ ⊆ ({I}∪ S) \ {i} (t′ = 0





(v({i} ∪ T′)− v(T′)), (17)
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and we define ϕSj ≡ π̄Im(ℓ, m) for all j ∈ M.14 By the above definition, ϕ
S
I + ∑i∈S ϕ
S
i =








Aumann-Drèze value for each licensee.
The interpretation of the Aumann-Drèze value is as follows. For each i ∈ {I} ∪ S and for
each T′ ⊆ ({I} ∪ S) \ {i}, v({i} ∪ T′)− v(T′) is called the marginal contribution of firm i to
coalition T′. In the formation process for {I} ∪ S, when a coalition T′ already forms and a firm i
joins that coalition, the firm demands and is promised to gain its marginal contribution to T′. If
the order in which each firm joins is determined with equal probability, then the Aumann-Drèze
value for each technology holder i in coalition {I} ∪ S is the average of i’s marginal contribution
to the formation of {I} ∪ S. In this sense, the Aumann-Drèze value represents a fair profit
division among {I} ∪ S.
When the number of licensees is ℓ∗ and the number of potential imitators is infinitely large,
the Aumann-Drèze value is specified as follows.
Proposition 4. Consider the case in which an infinite number of potential imitators exist, and let
FAD(ℓ∗) be the licensing fee that corresponds to the Aumann-Drèze value under coalition structure
P(S∗), where |S∗| = ℓ∗. Then, FAD(ℓ∗) = π̄Th(ℓ
∗)/2; that is, each licensee pays half of its entire profit
as the fee paid to the innovator who licenses to ℓ∗ firms.
Proof. See Appendix.
Applying the Aumann-Drèze value, we define the ratio of the licensing fee to (gross) profit
as f AD ≡ FAD(ℓ∗)/π̄Th(ℓ
∗). Then, by Proposition 4, f AD = 1/2, and the net profits of the
innovator and each licensee are πADI (ℓ
∗) (= limm→∞ ϕS
∗









∗)/2, respectively; that is, in the Aumann-Drèze value, each licensee gains
positive net profit.
When infinitely many imitators exist, nonlicensees’ (gross) profits are always zero. Thus,
the innovator’s participation in nonlicensee coalitions contributes to the large increase in total
profit through the licensing of the patented technology. On the other hand, for an infinitely
large number of imitators, the formation of {I} ∪ S∗ maximizes the total profit of the innovator
and the licensees. From this viewpoint, not only the innovator but also each licensee contributes
to the realization of the maximum total profit. Therefore, each licensee obtains a positive profit
in the Aumann-Drèze value.15
14When we follow the original definition of the Aumann-Drèze value, ϕSj is given as ϕ
S
j = v({j}) = π̄Im(n − 1, 1)
for all j ∈ M. However, to suit our model, we define ϕSj = π̄Im(ℓ, m) for all j ∈ M.
15In the following argument, we assume that the number of licensees is ℓ∗ in order to compare the outcome when
the Aumann-Drèze value is adopted as the solution with that when the bargaining set is adopted. However, we can
show that the optimal number of licensees for the innovator when the Aumann-Drèze value is adopted is at least as
large as ℓ∗; that is, the Aumann-Drèze value for the innovator is not always maximized when ℓ∗ firms are licensed.
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4.2 Dynamic outcomes in an industry and general equilibrium
Bellman equations
The licensee’s firm value and the innovator’s firm value satisfy the following Bellman equa-
tions:16






+ θz(VI − Vℓ)− zw
}
. (18)







∗)− θZ(VI − Vℓ). (19)
Steady state
We solve for the steady state of this economy by using V̇I = V̇ℓ = 0 again. The labor market equi-
librium condition is the same as (9). We derive another important equation that characterizes
the steady state. In the steady state, (19) implies that






Next, we solve for the steady state value of Vℓ. For the same reason as in the previous




∗)/2 and (18), the following equation
holds in the steady state:





The appendix shows that there are no transitional dynamics and that the economy immediately
jumps to the steady state at t = 0, as shown in Proposition 2.


















By solving (22) and (23), we obtain the aggregate R&D intensity for the case in which the
Aumann-Drèze value is the solution in the unconstrained economy as follows:
Z∗ =
(χ − 1)L − 2ρ/θ
χ + 1
≡ ZADU . (24)
16Note that ℓ is fixed at ℓ∗ because we consider a situation in which policy makers intervene in the patent licensing
negotiations between the innovator and the ℓ∗ licensees.
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5 Growth and welfare effects of intervention in the unconstrained
economy
In this section, we investigate the effects of an intervention in the licensing negotiation on
growth and welfare by using ZBU and Z
AD
U , derived in the previous section.
5.1 Growth effect




U holds. Since the economic
growth rate g = ċ/c is calculated as g = θZ ln λ, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Consider the unconstrained economy. Then, an intervention in licensing negotiations
decreases the growth rate.
Proposition 5 suggests that policy makers should not intervene in licensing negotiations
from the perspective of economic growth. The intuition is simple. First, the exploitative
licensing fee ( f B = 1) maximizes the innovator’s licensing revenue. This naturally stimulates
the licensee’s incentive to innovate (the Schumpeterian effect). Second, because a higher licensing
fee decreases the net profits of licensees, they attempt to escape from the current severe situation
by succeeding in R&D.
5.2 Welfare effect
To compare f B = 1 with f AD = 1/2 from the perspective of welfare, we first derive the first-best
allocation in the unconstrained economy. We evaluate welfare in the case in which the economy
starts in the steady state at t = 0. By the utility function (2) and the labor market equilibrium
condition (9), we have
ln ct = g · t + ln(L − Z)− ln L.
By integrating the lifetime utility function (1) with respect to time, we obtain the represen-







+ ln(L − Z)− ln L
]
. (25)










We assume that ZS > 0 because ZS = 0 is a trivial case in an innovation-driven growth economy.
Then, by (25), the relationship between W and Z is an inverted U-shape.
There is no guarantee that aggregate R&D intensity in the unconstrained economy (ZBU
or ZADU ) coincides with the socially optimal level Z
S. Depending on the parameters, Z can

























Figure 2: Welfare and patent protection.
model. First, there is a business stealing effect that leads firms to engage in more R&D than
the socially optimal level.17 Second, a positive externality exists because firms choose to invest
in R&D without taking into account the welfare of the household. Third, the number of
producers (firms) is also determined regardless of welfare. Therefore, labor can be allocated
to the production sector either excessively or insufficiently. Finally, the license fee distorts the
allocation of labor by influencing the incentive to innovate.
Let WB and WAD be welfare under no intervention (the bargaining set) and welfare under
intervention (the Aumann-Drèze value), respectively. Recall that ZBU and Z
AD
U are increasing in
χ and ZADU < Z
B





S holds when χ is sufficiently small. In
this case, as shown in Panel (a) of Figure 2, WB > WAD holds. However, when χ is sufficiently
large, ZBU may exceed Z
S. In this case, since the relationship between welfare and Z is an
inverted U-shape, WAD > WB may hold, as in Panel (b) of Figure 2. Figure 3 is a numerical
example that shows that such a parameter range exists.
The above discussion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 6. Consider the unconstrained economy. When patent protection is sufficiently weak, in-
tervention in licensing negotiations is harmful to welfare. However, when patent protection is sufficiently
strong, intervention may improve welfare.
The economic intuition behind Proposition 6 is simple. Under weak patent protection, since
the reward from innovation is small, the licensee’s incentive to innovate is also small. Then,
the degree of innovation is likely to be lower than the socially optimal level. In this case, the
exploitative licensing fee is socially desirable because it encourages licensees to engage in R&D
by rising the reward for innovation. In contrast, under strong patent protection, the reward for
17The business stealing effect originally meant that a new entrant decreases the output of incumbent firms in
Mankiw and Whinston (1986). In our model, a licensee’s successful R&D also decreases the innovator’s output. In
this sense, we call this the business stealing effect.
19













Patent protection (()← weak strong →
Figure 3: A numerical example of Proposition 6. The parameters are L = 1, λ = 3, ρ = 0.02, and
θ = 0.023. The condition in (16) is satisfied.
innovation is already large. Then, under the exploitative licensing fee, innovation may exceed
the socially optimal level. In this case, a fair licensing fee is socially better.
6 Growth and welfare effects of intervention in a constrained econ-
omy
For simplicity, we considered two unrealistic assumptions in the unconstrained economy. First,
we assumed that licensees can raise unlimited external funds for R&D investment by issuing
stocks. Second, we assumed that licensees distribute all of their profit to their shareholders.
However, in reality, the amount of external funds available is usually limited due to financial
market frictions created by information asymmetries, uncertainty in R&D investment, and
transaction costs.18 Furthermore, in the literature on corporate finance, it is well known that
firms prefer to rely on their internal funds rather than on external funds for R&D investment.19
This firm behavior is also consistent with the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984).
Namely, firms prefer to use internal financing first, while issuing new equity is a last resort.
These facts require some modifications to the previous model. The model that imposes financial
constraints is referred to as the constrained economy.
18Additionally, R&D-intensive firms may face financial frictions because they tend to have few collateralizable
assets. A large part of R&D expenditures is wages for researchers, and obviously, their human capital cannot be
collateralized. Furthermore, equity financing entails costs in the sense that the stock price drops at the announcement
of a new equity issue (see Eckbo et al. (2007)).
19See Hall and Lerner (2010) for this point.
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6.1 The growth effect
In this section, we consider a constrained economy with two financial constraints. First, we
assume that the external funds available to each licensee are limited to a finite value κ ≥ 0. We
can interpret the unconstrained economy as the case in which κ → ∞. Let zE be the number
of researchers whose costs are financed through external funds. Then, each licensee faces the
following external financial constraint:
zEw ≤ κ. (26)
Second, we assume that the licensees can use their internal funds (i.e., their profit flow) for R&D
investment. Let zI be the number of researchers whose costs are financed through internal funds.
Then, each licensee faces the following internal financial constraint:
zIw ≤ πℓ, (27)
where πℓ is the licensee’s net profit. In this case, each licensee’s Bellman equation becomes
rVℓ − V̇ℓ = max
zI ,zE
[πℓ − zIw + θ(zI + zE)(VI − Vℓ)− zEw] (28)
subject to (26) and (27).
In an unconstrained economy, intervention in patent licensing negotiations is always harmful
to economic growth. However, the result changes when imposing the above two financial
constraints.
First, we consider the constrained economy under no intervention ( f B = 1). Then, since
πℓ = 0, licensees cannot use their internal funds for their R&D investment (zI = 0). They must
conduct their R&D by using only external funds. Then, (28) becomes
rVℓ − V̇ℓ = max
zE
[θzE(VI − Vℓ)− zEw] .
This is exactly the same as the Bellman equation (7) in the unconstrained economy if we
replace zE with z. Therefore, when the external financial constraint is not binding (i.e., κ > 0 is
sufficiently large), aggregate R&D intensity becomes (15). When the external financial constraint
is binding (i.e., κ > 0 is sufficiently small), zE = κ/w holds. From this and the labor market




(χ − 1)/(χκ) + 1
≡ ZBC. (29)
Note that ZBC = 0 holds when κ = 0 and that Z
B
C is increasing in κ.









Let κ∗ be the critical value such that ZBU = Z
B
C holds. Then, as shown in Figure 4, Z
B is strictly
















Figure 4: ZB and ZAD in the constrained economy. κ is the availability of external funds.
Second, we consider the constrained economy when interventions occur. In this economy,
since πℓ = π̄Th(ℓ
∗)/2 > 0, licensees can use their internal funds for their R&D investment.
Note that in the licensee’s Bellman equation (28), the licensee is indifferent to the choice be-
tween financing with internal funds and external funds (the sum zI + zE is what matters). For
simplicity, we assume that licensees prefer to use internal funds rather than external funds.
Then, there is no case in which the external financial constraint is binding and the internal
financial constraint is not binding.
If κ > 0 is sufficiently large, the external financial constraint is not binding. Then, aggregate
R&D intensity ℓ∗(z∗I + z
∗
E) is equal to (24) in the unconstrained economy. Suppose that κ >
0 is sufficiently small and the external financial constraint is binding. Then, by the above














2(χ − 1)/[(χ − 1)2/χ + 2κχ] + 1
≡ ZADC .
Note that ZBC < Z
AD
C holds since χ > 1. Aggregate R&D intensity in the constrained economy








Depending on the parameters, ZAD = ZADU holds for all κ ≥ 0 or only for a large κ. However,
regardless of the parameters, ZAD < ZB holds when κ is sufficiently large, and 0 = ZB < ZAD
holds when κ = 0, as shown in Figure 4. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, we can
find the critical value κ̄ > 0 such that ZB < ZAD holds for κ ∈ [0, κ̄). This argument can be
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summarized as follows:
Proposition 7. Consider the constrained economy. Intervention in licensing negotiations reduces
growth when external funds are readily available. In contrast, intervention enhances growth when
external funds are less available.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is the same as that behind Proposition 5 when external
funds are readily available. However, when external funds are less available, licensees finance
a large part of their R&D investment with internal funds. Since intervention in licensing
negotiations increases the internal funds of the licensees, it can enhance their R&D investment.
In contrast, since negotiation without intervention does not give internal funds to licensees, it
prevents them from improving the licensed technology.
6.2 The welfare effect
Let us investigate the welfare effect of the intervention. Suppose that external funds are suffi-
ciently available such that ZB = ZBU and Z
AD = ZADU hold. Then, Z
AD < ZB holds as shown
in Figure 4. In this case, as in the unconstrained economy, the welfare effect of the intervention
depends on the strength of patent protection; that is, the welfare effect is exactly the same as in
Proposition 6.
The case in which external funds are less available is analytically complex. Therefore, we
numerically evaluate the welfare effect of the intervention by calibrating our model to aggregate
data on the U.S. economy. We set the discount rate ρ to the conventional value of 0.03. According
to Hashmi (2013), the average of the Lerner index in the U.S. is 0.24. In our model, the Lerner
index is 1/(1 + ℓ∗) = 1 − 1/χ. Then, we obtain χ ≃ 1.32. Because limm→∞ p(ℓ∗, m) = χw, in
our model, χ also means the markup of price over marginal cost. χ = 1.32 is in an empirically
plausible range (see Jones and Williams (2000)). We assume that patent protection in the U.S.
is almost perfect (λ = 1.32). This corresponds to Park (2008), who shows that the patent rights
index in the U.S. is 4.88 (the maximum is 5), the highest in the world. The Conference Board
Total Economy Database reports that the average total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate in
the U.S. is about 0.6%. According to the Business R&D and Innovation Survey, approximately
6% of domestic employment in the U.S. is engaged in R&D. We set L and θ by targeting these
two facts. Then, L = 1 and θ = 0.35 yield g ≃ 0.006 and Z/L ≃ 0.06.20 These parameters satisfy
(16).
Figure 5 numerically compares WB with WAD. The difference WAD −WB shows the welfare
effect of the intervention. WAD is constant for all κ because ZAD = ZADU always holds in the
numerical analysis. Figure 5 shows that the welfare effect of the intervention is positive when
external funds are less available. The intuition behind this result is the same as in Proposition
7. When external funds are less available, intervention in licensing negotiations increases the
20In this calibration, we consider a scenario in which g ≃ 0.006 and Z/L ≃ 0.06 in the unconstrained economy
(large κ) under the bargaining set ( f B = 1). Recall that Z (and also g) is increasing in κ and ZBU > Z
AD
U . Therefore,
in other words, we calibrate L and θ so that the maximum values of g and Z/L are equal to the target values.
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Availability of external funds (%)
Figure 5: A quantitative analysis. The parameters are L = 1, λ = χ = 1.32, ρ = 0.03, and θ = 0.35.
These parameters satisfy (16).
internal funds of the licensees. Therefore, since intervention can enhance R&D investment,
welfare increases.
We also conduct another numerical analysis under imperfect patent protection (χ ≤ λ). We
can interpret Figure 5 as the result of a special case of χ = λ. Figure 6 presents the results. The
value in the color bar in Panel (c) is WAD − WB, which is the welfare effect of the intervention.
Therefore, the red region in Panel (c) is the area in which intervention increases welfare. Figure 6
shows that the welfare effect of intervention is likely to be positive as patent protection becomes
stronger. This result implies that there is complementarity between a pro-patent policy and
intervention in licensing negotiations.
Why does patent protection strengthen the welfare effects of the intervention? This is
because stronger patent protection increases welfare under the Aumann-Drèze value (Panel
(a)) but decreases welfare under the bargaining set (Panel (b)). In this numerical analysis,
ZAD = ZADU holds for all κ and χ. Since stronger patent protection increases Z
AD
U , it also
increases welfare under the Aumann-Drèze value. However, in this numerical analysis, ZB = ZBC
holds when κ is small and χ is large (i.e., the financial constraint is binding). This implies that
stronger patent protection decreases ℓ∗ but does not increase z∗E much; that is, Z
B
C is decreasing
in χ. Therefore, when the financial constraint is binding, stronger patent protection decreases
































Availability of external funds (!)
Availability of external funds (!)
(a) Welfare under the AD value (#$%) (b) Welfare under the bargaining set (#&)
(c) Welfare difference (#$% −#&)
Figure 6: The welfare effect of the intervention under imperfect patent protection. In Panel (c), the red
region is the area in which the intervention increases welfare. The parameters are L = 1, λ = 1.32, ρ =
0.03, and θ = 0.35.
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7 Conclusion
The growth and welfare effects of intervention in licensing negotiations have been less well
known in the literature on endogenous growth theory. Although typical studies consider an
exogenous profit division rule, in reality, licensing fees are often determined through private
negotiations between the relevant firms. Generally, it is difficult for policy makers and some
organizations to directly control such licensing fees, but they can indirectly influence them
through certain interventions. We investigate the macroeconomic impacts of an indirect inter-
vention in licensing negotiations by considering a synthesis of cooperative game theory and
Schumpeterian growth theory. We introduce two solution concepts, the bargaining set and the
Aumann-Drèze value, in a Schumpeterian growth model. The bargaining set describes free
negotiation, while the Aumann-Drèze value represents an intervention from the outside.
Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, we show that negotiations without
intervention yield an exploitative licensing fee, while an intervention yields a fair licensing fee.
Second, we find that the growth effect of intervention is negative when firms can raise unlimited
external funds for their R&D investment. However, the growth effect becomes positive when
the amount of external funds available is limited. Finally, our quantitative analysis shows that
intervention can increase welfare when external funds are less available and patent protection is
sufficiently strong. These results imply that intervention can increase both growth and welfare
when the internal funds of firms are the main source of their R&D investment in an economy
with strong patent protection. In other words, there is complementarity between a pro-patent
policy and interventions in licensing negotiations.
Appendix
The proof of Proposition 1
Take any π ∈ BS with |S| = ℓ (< ∞). We first show that limm→∞ πi = 0 for each i ∈ S. Let
i′ ∈ arg maxi∈S πi, and consider the following two cases.
Case (i): πi′ > π̄Im(ℓ, m). Order all the ℓ+ m firms according to their profits in nondecreasing
order, and take the first ℓ firms. Let T be the set of the first ℓ firms. Note that πj = π̄Im(ℓ, m)
for j ∈ M because π ∈ Π(S). Then, the innovator has objection (π′, {I} ∪ T) against i′
because πI + ∑i∈T πi < πI + ∑i∈S πi = (1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ, m) = v({I} ∪ T). However, i
′ can have
counter-objection (π′′, R) to the innovator’s objection (π′, {I} ∪ T) because π ∈ BS. Note that
i′ ∈ R ⊆ S ∪ M by the definition of a counter-objection, and 0 ≤ πi for all i ∈ S ∪ M because
π ∈ Π(S). Thus, for each i ∈ S, 0 ≤ πi ≤ πi′ ≤ ∑i∈R πi ≤ v(R) = rπ̄Im(ℓ + m − r, r) ≤
(ℓ+ m)π̄Im(0, ℓ+ m), where r = |R| ≤ ℓ+ m, by the definition of i
′ and (6). Because
lim
m→∞





1 + (ℓ+ m)χ
)2
= 0,
we have limm→∞ πi = 0 for each i ∈ S by the squeeze theorem.
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Case (ii): πi′ ≤ π̄Im(ℓ, m). In this case, by the definition of i
′, πi ≤ π̄Im(ℓ, m) for all i ∈ S. Note
that 0 ≤ πi for all i ∈ S because π ∈ Π(S). If ℓ > ℓ
∗, then πi = 0 for each i ∈ S by (6); thus,
limm→∞ πi = 0 for each i ∈ S. Suppose that ℓ ≤ ℓ
∗. Then, for each i ∈ S, 0 ≤ πi ≤ π̄Im(ℓ, m).
Because limm→∞ π̄Im(ℓ, m) = 0 under the supposition in (6), we also have limm→∞ πi = 0 for
each i ∈ S by the squeeze theorem.
We next show that limm→∞ πI = limm→∞(1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ, m). Because S is fixed (i.e., S does
not depend on m) and limm→∞ πi = 0 for all i ∈ S, limm→∞ ∑i∈S πi = 0. By the definition of












(1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ, m).
Let FB(ℓ) be the licensing fee that corresponds to the imputations in the bargaining set for
coalition structure P(S), where |S| = ℓ, and recall that π̄Th(ℓ) ≡ limm→∞ π̄Th(ℓ, m). Then, in
the bargaining set for coalition structure P(S), the innovator’s (net) profit is πBI (ℓ) = π̄Th(ℓ) +
ℓFB(ℓ) = limm→∞ πI = (1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ); that is, F
B(ℓ) = π̄Th(ℓ). Furthermore, by (5),
πBI (ℓ) = (1 + ℓ)π̄Th(ℓ) =
{
(1 + ℓ) (1 − 1/χ)2 if ℓ < ℓ∗
1/(1 + ℓ) if ℓ ≥ ℓ∗,
which implies that πBI (ℓ) is increasing in ℓ < ℓ
∗ but is decreasing in ℓ ≥ ℓ∗. Thus, the innovator’s
(net) profit is maximized at ℓ = ℓ∗.
The proof of Proposition 2
The RHS of (13) decreases in Z and is illustrated as the downward sloping curve “NAC” in
Figure 7. The RHS of (14) is increasing in Z and is illustrated as the upward sloping curve
“LME” in Figure 7. The intersection of the two curves in Figure 7 represents the steady state of
this economy.
Suppose firm value grows without bound along the LME curve in Figure 7 above the steady














Note that π̄Th(ℓ) is a positive constant. As VI grows infinitely, the first term on the RHS of
(31) converges to zero, and the third term on the RHS of (31) converges to −θZ < 0. Then, the
growth rate of firm value, V̇I/VI , will eventually be larger than the discount rate.














Figure 7: The steady state under no intervention in licensing negotiations.
value VI (note that Vℓ = 0). From the asset market equilibrium condition (At = VI) and rt = ρ,




This condition states that the growth rate of VI cannot be larger than the discount rate. Therefore,
the LME curve above the steady state is a path that eventually violates the transversality
condition.
Suppose, by contrast, that firm value decreases along the LME curve below the steady-state
level. Then, VI and Z converge to zero in the phase diagram in Figure 7. This implies that all
equities will have zero value in the future. However, in Cournot competition with finite firms,
the innovator’s profit is strictly positive. Moreover, as Z = 0, a household with the innovator’s
equity can earn a positive dividend forever. Therefore, this path entails unfulfilled expectations.
As a result, the economy must immediately jump to the steady state at t = 0 and remain
there forever. This is the unique path that satisfies the transversality condition and rational
expectations.
The proof of Proposition 3
In this proof, we demonstrate that ℓ∗ is also dynamically optimal under the parameter condition
given in (16). In Proposition 1, we already showed that ℓ∗ is statically optimal. Note that if the
innovator chooses ℓ > 0, then ℓ∗ maximizes the RHS of (8) because the innovator takes Z as
given. Therefore, the innovator does not have an incentive to choose a positive ℓ ̸= ℓ∗ in (8)
because it decreases his/her net profit and does not decrease the risk of creative destruction
(Z). However, the innovator may have an incentive to choose ℓ = 0 because Z = 0 holds. In
this proof, we show that the RHS of (8) when ℓ = ℓ∗ is larger than the RHS when ℓ = 0. Note
28
that f B = 1 is independent from ℓ by Proposition 1.
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(χ − 1)L − ρ/θ
χ(L + ρ/θ)
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The left-hand side of the last inequality is increasing in χ ∈ [1, λ). Therefore, (16) is a sufficient
condition for the dynamic optimality of ℓ∗.
The proof of Proposition 4
Note that ℓ∗ = |S∗|, and let t = |T| for T ⊆ S∗ (t = 0 if T = ∅). By (17), the Aumann-Drèze
value ϕS
∗







(v({I} ∪ T)− v(T)).
When t is fixed, there are ℓ∗!/(t!(ℓ∗ − t)!) orderings with the same marginal contribution
v({I} ∪ T)− v(T) = (1 + t)π̄Th(t, ℓ
∗ + m − t)− tπ̄Im(ℓ
∗ + m − t, t) by the innovator because
licensees in S∗ are identical. Thus, the Aumann-Drèze value ϕS
∗









[(1 + t)π̄Th(t, ℓ
∗ + m − t)− tπ̄Im(ℓ
∗ + m − t, t)] . (32)
For each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ℓ∗, m > t when m is sufficiently large. Then, π̄Im(ℓ
∗ + m − t, t) = 0
by (6), so we have limm→∞ tπ̄Im(ℓ
∗ + m − t, t) = 0 for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ℓ∗.
Note that for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ℓ∗,
(1 + t)π̄Th(t, ℓ








∗) = (1 − 1/χ)2. Then, by (32) and the above facts, when infinitely many imitators
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[(1 + t)π̄Th(t, ℓ
∗ + m − t)− tπ̄Im(ℓ





























Let FAD(ℓ∗) be the licensing fee that corresponds to the Aumann-Drèze value under the
coalition structure P(S∗), where |S∗| = ℓ∗. Then, by the above Aumann-Drèze value, the inno-
vator’s (net) profit is πADI (ℓ
∗) = π̄Th(ℓ





that is, FAD(ℓ∗) = π̄Th(ℓ
∗)/2.
The equilibrium path under intervention in licensing negotiations
From (9) and w = θ(VI − Vℓ), we obtain




which is increasing in VI and decreasing in Vℓ. The RHS of (20) is decreasing in Z.21 Therefore,
when VI rises, the RHS of (20) decreases while the LHS of (20) increases. Then, Vℓ must increase
to equate both sides of (20). This implies that the V̇I = 0 curve is increasing in Vℓ, as shown in
Figure 8. In line with (21), V̇ℓ = 0 is represented as a vertical line in Figure 8.
Figure 8 shows that the steady state is unique. If the economy does not begin at the
steady state, there are four possible paths in Figure 8. First, we consider the northeast case
(V̇I > 0, V̇ℓ > 0). In this case, VI and Vℓ grow infinitely. In the proof of Proposition 2, we already
show that V̇I/VI will be larger than the discount rate. We obtain the same result in this case.22
Furthermore, the transversality condition can be rewritten as limt→∞ exp(−ρt)(VI + ℓ
∗Vℓ) = 0.
This implies that the growth rate of VI + ℓ
∗Vℓ must be smaller than the discount rate. Therefore,
the northeast case violates the transversality condition. Second, we consider the northwest case
(V̇I > 0, V̇ℓ < 0). As in the previous case, VI grows infinitely, and the growth rate becomes
higher than the discount rate. Therefore, for the same reason, the northwest case violates the
transversality condition. Third, we consider the southeast case (V̇I < 0, V̇ℓ > 0). In this case, VI
decreases, and eventually, 0 = VI < Vℓ holds. This means that R&D activities are not profitable.
Hence, Z = 0 holds. However, the innovator can earn a positive profit forever because there is
no risk of creative destruction. Therefore, a household that owns the innovator’s equity can earn
21By the zero profit condition w = θ(VI − Vℓ), as long as the equilibrium wage rate is positive, VI > Vℓ holds.
Then, the RHS of (20) is decreasing in Z.
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Figure 8: The steady state under interventions in licensing negotiations.
a positive dividend forever. This implies that the southeast case entails unfulfilled expectations.
Finally, we consider the southwest case (V̇I < 0, V̇ℓ < 0). In this case, the economy transitions
to the origin (Vℓ = VI = 0). For the same reason as in the southeast case, this entails unfulfilled
expectations.
Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium path in which the economy immediately jumps to
the steady state at t = 0 and remains there forever. Since there are only jumpable variables in
the dynamics, there are no transitional dynamics in the model.
References
[1] Aumann, R. J., & Drèze, J. H. (1974). “Cooperative games with coalition structures,” Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 3(4), 217-237.
[2] Chen, C. S. (2017). “Endogenous market structure and technology licensing,” The Japanese
Economic Review, 68(1), 115-130.
[3] Chu, A. C. (2009). “Effects of blocking patents on R&D: A quantitative DGE analysis.”
Journal of Economic Growth, 14(1), 55-78.
[4] Chu, A. C., Cozzi, G., & Galli, S. (2012). “Does intellectual monopoly stimulate or stifle
innovation?,” European Economic Review, 56(4), 727-746.
[5] Chu, A. C., & Pan, S. (2013). “The escape-infringement effect of blocking patents on inno-
vation and economic growth,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17(4), 955-969.
[6] Davis, M. & Maschler, M. (1967). “Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative
games,” In: Schubik, M. (Ed.), Essays in mathematical economics in honor of Oskar
Morgenstern. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 39-52, (The abstract appeared
in Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 69, pp. 106-108, 1963).
31
[7] Eckbo, B. E., Masulis, R. W., & Norli, Ø. (2007). “Security offerings,” In Handbook of
empirical corporate finance (pp. 233-373). Elsevier.
[8] Goh, A. T., & Olivier, J. (2002). “Optimal patent protection in a two‐sector economy,”
International Economic Review, 43(4), 1191-1214.
[9] Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (1991). “Innovation and growth in the global economy,” The
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[10] Hall, B. H., & Lerner, J. (2010). “The financing of R&D and innovation,” In Handbook of
the Economics of Innovation (Vol. 1, pp. 609-639). North-Holland.
[11] Hashmi, A. R. (2013). “Competition and innovation: The inverted-U relationship revisited,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(5), 1653-1668.
[12] Igami, M. (2017).“ Estimating the innovator’s diLemma: Structural analysis of creative
destruction in the hard disk drive industry, 1981-1998,” Journal of Political Economy,
125(3), 798-847.
[13] Jones, C. I., & Williams, J. C. (2000). “Too much of a good thing? The economics of
investment in R&D,” Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), 65-85.
[14] Kamien, M. I., & Tauman, Y. (1986). “Fees versus royalties and the private value of a
patent,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(3), 471-491.
[15] Kishimoto, S., Watanabe, N., & Muto, S. (2011). “Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing:
Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 61(2),
114-123.
[16] Layne-Farrar, A., Padilla, A. J., & Schmalensee, R. (2007). “Pricing patents for licensing
in standard-setting organizations: Making sense of frand commitments,” Antitrust Law
Journal, 74(3), 671-706.
[17] Mankiw, G., & Whinston, D. (1986). “Free entry and social inefficiency,” The RAND Journal
of Economics, 48-58.
[18] Muto, S. (1993). “On licensing policies in Bertrand competition,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 5(2), 257-267.
[19] Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). “Corporate financing and investment decisions when
firms have information that investors do not have,” Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2),
187-221.
[20] von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,”
1st Edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, [2nd Edn. 1947], [3rd Edn. 1953].
[21] Niwa, S. (2016). “Patent claims and economic growth,” Economic Modelling, 54, 377-381.
[22] Niwa, S. (2018). “Effects of a blocking patent on R&D with endogenous survival activities,”
Journal of Economics, 125(3), 263-277.
[23] O’donoghue, T., & Zweimüller, J. (2004). “Patents in a model of endogenous growth,”
Journal of Economic Growth, 9(1), 81-123.
[24] Park, W. G. (2008). “International patent protection: 1960-2005,” Research Policy, 37(4),
761-766.
[25] Peleg, B. (1967). “Existence theorem for the bargaining set Mi1,” In: Schubik, M. (Ed.),
Essays in mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton University
32
Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 53-56, (The abstract appeared in Bulletin of the American Mathe-
matical Society 69, pp. 109-110, 1963).
[26] Robbins, C. A. (2009). “Measuring payments for the supply and use of intellectual prop-
erty,” In “International trade in services and intangibles in the era of globalization,” Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
[27] Sakakibara, M. (2010). “An empirical analysis of pricing in patent licensing contracts,”
Industrial and Corporate Change, 19(3), 927-945.
[28] Sen, D., & Tauman, Y. (2007). “General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 59(1), 163-186.
[29] Suzuki, K. (2020). “Patent protection, optimal licensing, and innovation with endogenous
entry,” Macroeconomics Dynamics, 24(8), 2033-2059.
[30] Tanaka, H., Iwaisako, T., & Futagami, K. (2007). “Dynamic analysis of innovation and in-
ternational transfer of technology through licensing,” Journal of International Economics,
73(1), 189-212.
[31] Tauman, Y., & Watanabe, N. (2007). “The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the
asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results,” Economic Theory, 30(1), 135-149.
[32] Wang, Y., Zhou, Z., & Li-Ying, J. (2013). “The impact of licensed-knowledge attributes
on the innovation performance of licensee firms: evidence from the Chinese electronic
industry,” The Journal of Technology Transfer, 38(5), 699-715.
[33] Watanabe, N., & Muto, S. (2008). “Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General
bargaining outcomes,” International Journal of Game Theory, 37, 505-523.
[34] Yang, Y. (2018). “On the optimality of IPR protection with blocking patents,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 27, 205-230.
[35] Yang, G., & Maskus, K. E. (2001). “Intellectual property rights, licensing, and innovation in
an endogenous product-cycle model,” Journal of International Economics, 53(1), 169-187.
[36] Yang, L., & Maskus, K. E. (2009). “Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and
exports in developing countries,” Journal of Development Economics, 90(2), 231-236.
33
